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ABSTRACT 
This article reviews the history of the Law Commission project on administrative law 
and citizen from 2003, a project which the Law Commission essentially substantively 
ended in 2010. The project provides lessons both about the initiation and design of 
law reform projects and on the prospect of law reform being institutionally capable of 
contributing to the development of core areas of public law. 
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Introduction 
The aim of this article is to reflect on, and learn some lessons from, the most µpublic ODZ¶ project 
that the Law Commission has attempted during the life of what is now the Public and Welsh 
Law Team at the Commission. That project was known by various names. The report was titled 
µAdministrative Redress 3XEOLF %RGLHV DQG WKH &LWL]HQ¶ DQG , UHIHU WR LW DV µthe remedies 
prRMHFW¶ below. Although it was the most public law project, it also involved substantial 
consideration of private law issues, in the context of the liability of public bodies. From this 
experience, I suggest the key lessons for future administrative justice law reform by the Law 
Commission are, first, that this project does not provide a guide to how to do it in the future, 
and indeed, it is highly unlikely that a similar project would be attempted now. Secondly, taking 
on any project in this area requires political thinking about how to frame a project that is capable 
RIEHLQJXQGHUWDNHQXVLQJWKH/DZ&RPPLVVLRQ¶VLQGHSHndent and non-political methodology. 
And ILQDOO\LQWKHOLJKWRIWKHDERYHLWLVXQOLNHO\WKDWDIDUUHDFKLQJµSXUHSXEOLFODZ¶SURMHFW
could realistically be countenanced by the Law Commission, at least if anything like current 
political conditions persist.  
The current writer was the civil service lawyer who was team manager of the relevant team 
from its inception at the end of 2000/beginning of 2001 to the end of 2014. What follows relies 
in part on my memory of some facts; and more importantly, on a general knowledge and a set 
of XQGHUVWDQGLQJVDULVLQJRXWRIP\SDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDODQGµFXOWXUDO¶ context of 
the work I was then undertaking.  
In its small way, therefore, this article raises big issues about the academic use of personal 
recollection and experience. There is a considerable academic literature within anthropology 
and sociology/criminology RQµLQVLGHUUHVHDUFK¶ in ethnography (Hodgson 2005; Southgate and 
Shying 2014; Ferrell and Hamm 1998). That deals in part with questions of how, and whether, 
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of the purported insider is to be assessed. These sorts of questions do not arise (at least, not in 
DQ\WKLQJOLNHWKHVDPHZD\ZKHQRQHORRNVEDFNDVDUHVHDUFKHURQRQH¶VRZQSUH-research 
life. But the literature does, valuably, also point at the advantages of insider status, providing 
as it does some claim to access to particular experiences, to a rich knowledge of the 
HQYLURQPHQWWRDQµLQWLPDWHFXOWXUDONQRZOHGJHRIWKHFRQWH[WV¶ (Southgate and Shying 2014) 
involved. And this conception of insider status has been used in legal or socio-legal research 
(Abram and Blandy 2018).  
But if there are advantages in insider status, they are not conclusive: as Wolcott puts it, 
³>W@KHUHLVQRPRQROLWKLFLQVLGHUYLHZ«WKHUHDUHPXOWLSOHLQVLGHUYLHZVPXOWLSOHRXWVLGHU
YLHZV(YHU\YLHZLVDZD\RIVHHLQJQRWWKHZD\RIVHHLQJ´ (Wolcott 1999, p. 137) 
Another way of looking at how one puts personal experience to use is memoir. This article 
might be thought of as containing a (small) personal memoir. Memoir is considered a legitimate 
source for the historian: but not an unproblematic one (Janken 2016).1 A memoir is to be treated 
with care, and using it, another researcher must take full account of the biases, personal or 
normative, of the memoirist, and where possible seek corroboration. However, if an historian 
can footnote a memoir, which records the memoir-ZULWHU¶VSHUVRQDODFTXDLQWDQFH2 with a fact 
or experience, then the researcher writing in part from his or her own personal experience can, 
HTXDOO\ IRUJR IRRWQRWLQJ D IDFW RU H[SHULHQFH ZKLFK UHOLHV RQ WKDW UHVHDUFKHU¶V SHUVRQDO
acquaintance.  
The fact that I rely in part on personal knowledge in this article should not be privileged, 
but neither should it be discounted.  
 
The context 
The development of the Public Law Team provides the immediate context. One might think 
that the existence of a team called the ³3XEOLF Law 7HDP´ with a Commissioner with the same 
title, meant that the Law Commission had decided at some point in the abstract that it needed a 
resource to do public law law reform, and had created the bureaucratic apparatus to accomplish 
that. It was not like that. It was, rather, an outcome of the response of the Commission to 
particular contingencies during the relevant period. 
Initially, the team was called the Administrative Justice Team, and then for some time the 
Housing and Administrative Justice Team. This reflected the fact that its main project from 
2001 to 2006 was a major project on housing tenure reform (Law Commission 2006).3 The 
original impetus for this project had come from the then Chairman of the Commission, Lord 
Carnwath, as he now is. The ³DGPLQLVWUDWLYH MXVWLFH´ element came from the fact that the 
Commission had effectively been handed a small project on a particular group of tribunals by 
the Leggatt Review of Tribunals (Law Commission 2003). 
The Commissioner from 2001 until 2006 was Professor Martin Partington CBE QC, an 
academic who specialised in housing law and administrative justice. He happened to be a 
perfect fit to undertake these projects, rather than the team taking its character from his 
interests. PartingtRQ VXEVHTXHQWO\ VWD\HG RQ DV D µspecial consuOWDQW¶ to finish two further 
housing law projects after Kenneth Palmer QC became Commissioner in 2006 (Law 
Commission 2008a; 2008b). Palmer was the first of a sequence of practitioner-Commissioners 
for the team, the second of whom was Frances Pattison QC, who assumed office in January 
2010. The administrative redress project spanned the terms of office of Partington, Palmer and 
Patterson. The reference to Welsh law was added after Nicholas Paine QC, another practitioner, 
EHFDPH &RPPLVVLRQHU LQ  LQ UHFRJQLWLRQ RI WKH 7HDP¶V UROH LQ UHIRUPLQJ :HOVK ODZ 
(Percival 2019). 
It can be seen that the Team, from its inception, was not conceived as a resource to undertake 
what a university curriculum, or a practitioner, would think of as public law. The name  change 
occurred in about 2006, and may have had more to do with the recruitment of the Commissioner 
than anything else. Rather, projects dealing with substantive areas of what one might call broad 
VRFLDOZHOIDUHODZKDYHIHDWXUHG,IWKHILUVWSHULRGRIWKHWHDP¶VH[LVWHQFHZDVGRPLQDWHGE\
housing law, the second was dominated by another large and ambitious project on adult social 
care (from 2008 to 2011). Since then, the team has developed a series of portfolios of projects 
which involve the reform of large statutory regulatory structures, usually proposed and 
supported by departments other than the Ministry of Justice (the regulation of health care 
professionals, taxis and private hire vehicles, electoral law, planning law in Wales). 
 
The project 
In this section, I set out the history of the remedies project. The substance of the law reform 
proposals, and indeed of the criticism of them by academics and others, are only dealt with 
briefly, to the extent that that is necessary to give an account of the events. Anyone interested 
in these details may consult the referenced documents.  
 
First stages 
The original impetus for the remedies project was a paper presented by Michael Fordham at 
WKH*RYHUQPHQW/HJDO6HUYLFH¶VDQQXDODGPLQLVWUDWLYHODZFRQIHUHQFe in March 2003.4 That 
paper argued that existing tort causes of action were inadequate to give proper financial 
reparation for administrative failures resulting in financial loss. Fordham emphasised the need 
for an independent, flexible, public-type financial remedy on judicial review, rather than a 
binary, winner-takes-all tort-type remedy. 
The next step was a ³'LVFXVVLRQ 3DSHU´ issued by the Team (that is, not formally approved 
by the Commission). The Paper, at much greater length, pursued a broadly similar line, although 
without formally coming to conclusions. The Paper moved towards seeing the lack of a general 
discretionary power to award damages on judicial review as a lacuna, given the (at the time, 
new) power of the court to grant damages under the Human Rights Act, and the possibility of 
compensation in EU law cases. 
The Paper was in part prepared for discussion at what was described as a high level seminar, 
which took place in November 2004, presided over by Lord Phillips, the then Master of the 
Rolls. The seminar was critical of the court-centric approach taken in the Paper, and called for a 
wider perspective, including consideration of ADR, ombuds, complaints procedures and so on. 
This perspective clearly informed the approach formally adopted by the Commission when 
the first phase of the project was approved in the Ninth Programme of Law Reform (March 
2005), which emphasised a wide approach to dispute resolution. The Ninth Programme 
announced a scoping project to delineate the subject matter of a full scale law reform project. 
The Scoping report published as a result, however, moved back towards a more court- and 
money-centric approach. While insisting that it would still consider non-court means of redress, 
it centred what was GHVFULEHGDVD³EL-IRFDO´DSSURDFKFRQVLGHULQJERWKPRQHWDU\UHPHGLHV
on judicial review and private law claims against public bodies in tandem. 
This change in approach was partly the result of the problem of defining a realistic project, 
and also more closely reflected the views of Kenneth Parker, who became Commissioner in 
January 2006. 
The scoping report announced the terms on which the substantive project would proceed. It 
is more usual, certainly since that time, for the publication of a scoping report to constitute a 
review point in a project, that is, a point at which both Government and the Law Commission 
must decide whether to proceed. 
Thus the Scoping Report in this project assumed that the &RPPLVVLRQ¶V vires to undertake the 
substantive project relied on the Ninth Programme of Law Reform, which, in accordance with 
the procedure set down in Law Commissions Act 1965, section 3(1)(b) and (c), had been 
approved by the Lord Chancellor. 
This had been controversial between the Department for Constitutional Affairs (as it then 
was) and the Law Commission. Officials in the Department, apparently now more alive to the 
possible nature of the project, had argued that the Programme only covered the scoping review, 
and that a new reference under section 3(1)(e) of the 1965 Act was necessary for the substantive 
project. The Commission countered that the wording of the relevant entry in the Programme 
was such that it covered the substantive project as well. Whatever the subjective intentions of 
the drafters of the Programme had been in 2005, the Department did not press the point. 
 
The consultation paper 
Work accordingly started on the Consultation Paper. The paper was published in July 2008 (Law 
Commission 2008c). The proposals were far reaching. 7KHSDSHUFRQWLQXHGZLWKWKHµEL-IRFDO¶
approach, considering in tandem the availability of monetary remedies in public law, and 
claims for damages against public bodies in tort. 7KHFRUHZDVDUHTXLUHPHQWWRVKRZ³VHULRXV
IDXOW´EHIRUHGDPDJHVZHUHDYDLODEOHDJDLQVWDSXEOLFERG\ZKHWKHURQWKHSXEOLFRUSULYDWH
side (ie in addition to public law illegality, and negligence, respectively). This was expressly 
based on EU law principles. 
In judicial review, there would be a further hurdle, in that the statutory regime within which 
the public ERG\¶V decision fell would have to be, objectively, there to confer a benefit on the 
class of individual into which the claimant fell. Further, the award of damages in judicial review 
would remain discretionary, at least in a residual sense, as with the prerogative orders. 
Consideration of the private law side in the consultation paper was dominated by negligence, 
with a suggestion that breach of statutory duty and misfeasance in public office should be 
abolished. Within negligence, the aim was to carve out a category of ³WUXO\ SXEOLF´ acts of public 
bodies for a completely new scheme. :LWKLQ WKLV UHDOP WKH³VHULRXV IDXOW´ WKUHVKROGZRXOG
apply, thus, on the fault axis, narrowing the potential liability of public bodies. However, a 
wider range of claims would be justiciable by the courts. The same conferral of benefit test that 
was applied to damages in judicial review ZRXOG VWDQG LQ WKH VWHDG RI ³GXW\ RI FDUH´ LQ
negligence. And the courts would have a discretion to disapply the principle of joint and several 
OLDELOLW\ZLWKLQWKHµWUXO\SXEOLF¶ sphere. 
These proposals, it will be seen, were designed to be balanced. In some respects, public 
ERGLHV¶H[SRVXUHWRGDPDJHVZRXOGEHLQFUeased, becoming available on judicial review, and 
with the extension in the range of justiciable issues. However, in other respects, exposure would 
EHUHGXFHGE\YLUWXHRIWKHµVHULRXVIDXOW¶FULWHULRQDQGWKHSRVVLEOHGLVDSSOLFDWLRQRIMRLQWDQG
several liability.  
In addition to being presented as a balanced set of proposals, there were other attempts to 
reassure public bodies nervous about the effects of the proposals. First, much was made of the 
GDQJHUV RI µGHIHQVLYH DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶ LI OLDELOLW\ WR GDPages claims was extended, on an 
DQDORJXHZLWKWKHSKHQRPHQRQRIµGHIHQVLYHPHGLFLQH¶7RLQWHUURJDWHFODLPV and counter-
FODLPV DERXW µGHIHQVLYH DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶ a literature review was commissioned from Alex 
Marsh, professor of social policy at Bristol University, on the impact of changes to liability on 
the conduct of public bodies. The full report, which has never been separately published,5 
provides an exhaustive account of (largely) domestic and US literature on the question, and 
concludes that there is ultimately no generally applicable answer to the question: does increased 
liability encourage defensive administration or improve bureaucratic performance? It also 
indicated what features of public bodies affected how they might react (or not) (Law 
Commission 2008c, Appendix B). 
Secondly, the Consultation Paper included an analysis of all judicial review applications 
resulting in hearings in 2007 and concluded that, of 121 successful applications, µserious IDXOW¶ 
would have been found in 18 (Ibid., Appendix C). The aim of the analysis was to demonstrate 
that this criterion would mean that damages would only be available in a moderate proportion 
of successful applications for judicial review. 
However, the Consultation Paper did not, and could not, provide a proper cost/benefit 
analysis6XFKDQDQDO\VLVZDVQHFHVVDU\DVWKHFHQWUDOSDUWRIWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VUHTXLUHPHQW
for an Impact Assessment of major policy changes, which the Law Commission generally 
undertook. It was, however, impossible to conduct such an analysis in this instance, there being 
no reliable base-line evidence of the existing exposure to damages claims of public bodies in 
general, or central Government departments in particular.  
The public law proposals received a mixed reception on consultation. Put broadly, public 
law academics and practitioners supported the analysis that the lack of monetary remedies on 
judicial review was a flaw in the system. Some agreed with the proposals, although many had 
issues with one or more of the elements. Other consultees were much more likely to be critical. 
In part, this was a spill over from opposition to the private law proposals, the two sharing many 
characteristics, although there was certainly also principled opposition. There were also 
concerns on practical and procedural aspects. 
The response on the private law side was deVFULEHGLQWKHILQDOUHSRUWDVµDOPRVWXQLYHUVDOO\
QHJDWLYH¶. Probably the most fundamental and widespread criticism, shared by many of the 
PRVWSURPLQHQWDFDGHPLFVZDVWKDWWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VDQDO\VLVRIWKHIDLOings of the current 
system was wrong; and there was no need for reform. Secondly, even if there was a case for 
reform, then the proposals were unworkable, unsuitable, and generally unpleasantly continental 
in flavour. 
 
The Government View 
But it was the GoYHUQPHQW¶VUHVSRQVHWKDWZDVPRVWLPSRUWDQW to the outcome of the project. 
7KHILUVWSRLQWLVWKDWWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VIRUPDOUHVSRQVHUHFHLYHGIURPZKDWZDVE\WKHQWKH
Ministry of Justice (MoJ), had gone through a full scale Cabinet committee write-round. 
Normally, in a Law Commission consultation, the Department with policy responsibility would 
providing the response, which would be subject to whatever level of policy clearance was 
thought necessary within the Department. In this case, however, the MoJ thought it necessary 
to seek Government-wide policy approval for the response, via the relevant Cabinet 
Committee. This was very unusual and reflected the level of concern felt within Government 
about the project. 
It was also very late. The consultation period elapsed in November 2008. The Government 
response was received in May or early June 2009.6 While it was common enough for a 
UHVSRQVHLQFOXGLQJD*RYHUQPHQWUHVSRQVHWREHDIHZZHHNV¶ODWHWKLVOHYHORIGHOD\ZDV
unprecedented. 
This was not the first pause caused by Government concern. The original plan had been for 
the publication of a consultation paper before the end of 2007. The Commission had established 
a µGovernment Contact *URXS¶ FRPSRVHG ODUJHO\ RI *RYHUQPHQW ODZ\HUV ZKR ZHUH NHSW
informed of the work as it developed. In late 2007, the Commission was asked to delay 
publication pending the provision of new information on the likely impact on liability of the 
proposals. AlthoXJKWKH&RPPLVVLRQVWDWHGWKDWµthe delay did not to result in the production 
of DQ\ VLJQLILFDQW QHZ LQIRUPDWLRQ¶, the proposals were said to have been recast to avoid 
µPLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJV¶ (Law Commission 2008d, pp. 44-5). It does not appear that the proposals 
were significantly amended as a matter of substance at this point. 
There had been, and would continue to be, meetings with Treasury officials in an attempt to 
access even base-line data about existing exposure to compensation of central Government (let 
alone other parts of the public sector), which in the end proved fruitless. 
The *RYHUQPHQW¶V response was wholly and implacably negative in respect of both the 
public law proposals, and the new scheme for negligence, on both principled and practical 
grounds. It welcomed the proposals on joint and several liability, and (somewhat less warmly) 
those in respect of the ombuds. 
 
Withdrawal and the report 
It is normal for staff at the Law Commission to maintain continuous contact with officials in 
relevant Departments during the currency of a project. Standardly the point of contact is the 
official with primary policy responsibility for the area. Relations became more adversarial 
during the currency of the remedies project than is normally the case, and, rather than a policy 
official, the Departmental/Governmental side was represented by lawyers, including at a higher 
than normal level. It became apparent that there was interest in, and concern about, the project 
in a number of departments across Whitehall. Anecdotally, Commissioners and members of 
staff at the Commission working on wholly unrelated projects in other law reform teams were 
becoming aware of some level of hostility towards the Commission as a result of the project. 
On at least two occasions, there were meetings with the Treasury Solicitor, the head of the 
Government Legal Service, with permanent secretary status. 
Over the summer of 2009, it became clear to the Team that there was no point in continuing 
with the project as it related to the central themes of monetary remedies on judicial review and 
public bodies liability in negligence. Before Parker left office in September, the agreement of 
Commissioners had been secured for abandoning the main part of the project.  
The result was that when it was published in May 2010 (Law Commission 2010a), the Report 
announced that no further work would be done in respect of remedies on judicial review and the 
negligence scheme. The report gave two reasons for this. One was the firm opposition of the 
³NH\VWDNHKROGHU´WKH*RYHUQPHQW7KHVHFRQG ZDVWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VLQDELOLW\WRXQGHUWDNH
an analysis of the financial effect on the liability of public bodies of the proposals, in the 
absence of even basic data. This second reason was advanced as making it impossible to 
address the concerns expressed by Government. 
7KH5HSRUWDOVRFRQWDLQHGWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VVXEVWDQWLYHUHVSRQVHWRWKHFULWLFLVPVRIWKH
proposals made by consultees. In both cases (that is, the public and private sides) the defence was 
reasonably robust. But it was clear from the terms of the discussion that, while the Commission 
hoped that the question of monetary remedies on judicial review would continue to be 
discussed, it was accepted that the private law proposals were dead. It would be reasonable to 
assume that, if the approach of the Government had not been as it was, the Commission would 
have persisted with, while no doubt amending, the judicial review proposals, while 
discontinuing those relating to negligence. 
The relatively modest proposals in respect of ombuds were broadly supported,7 and the 
Report announced that work on this aspect would continue. There followed a further 
consultation paper in September 2010 and a final Report in 2011 (Law Commission 2011). 
In addition, the Report made recommendations on financial reporting, with a view to 
facilitating the collection of the data to allow the assessments of liability that had proved 
impossible to be undertaken in the future. 
 
What went wrong? 
Machinery of Government 
A key part of the Whitehall, and indeed, political, context is provided by the development of 
WKHROG/RUG&KDQFHOORU¶V'HSDUWPHQWLQWRWKH0LQLVWU\RI-XVWLFH 
7KH/RUG&KDQFHOORU¶V'HSDUWPHQWZDVDUHODWLYHO\VPDOOGHSDUWPHQWDOWKRXJKKDUGO\WLQ\
with 12,000 staff and a budget of about £2.4 billion in 2001/2. Its principal executive role was 
confined to administering the courts and legal aid. In addition, it had policy responsibility (as 
its successors have had) for the courts and the judiciary, and for the civil law ± that is to say, 
any part of the civil law that did not specifically belong somewhere else in Whitehall. It was the 
sponsoring Department for the Law Commission, with responsibility for recruitment, budget 
DQGVRIRUWK,QDGGLWLRQWRWKDWUROHWKH/&'¶VSROLF\UROHLQUHODWLRQWRFLYLOlaw meant that it 
was the Department with policy responsibility for the subject matter of many Law Commission 
projects. This was the case with the remedies project. 
In 2003, Lord Falconer was appointed Lord Chancellor, the Government tried, but 
ultimately failed, to abolish the post of Lord Chancellor, and the Department for Constitutional 
Affairs came into being. The DCA was more than a name change for the old LCD ± it acquired 
policy responsibility for constitutional reform in general, for the Channel Islands and the Isle 
of Man from the Home Office, and became a sort of feudal overlord of the Scotland and Wales 
Offices. But it did not add significantly to the executive responsibilities of the department. 
The change from DCA to Ministry of Justice in 2007 did, however. The new Department 
acquired policy responsibility for criminal law and penal affairs, and with it, executive 
responsibility for prisons and probation. In 2014/15, after some years of expenditure cuts, the 
0R-¶VEXGJHWZDVELOOLRQ. 
The old LCD was seen as a department which spoke for the judges, and therefore the law, 
within Whitehall. This was inextricably linked to the office of Lord Chancellor itself. The Lord 
Chancellor had always had a political and administrative dimension, but had also been the head 
of the judiciary. Until very recently, Lord Chancellors sat judicially (Lord Irvine being the last 
to do so). Since the late seventeenth century, Lord Chancellors had been members of the House 
of Lords (and indeed its speaker), and therefore, at least in recent times, not people with front-
rank political ambition.  
All this meant that when undertaking the policy role in relation to the civil law within its 
remit, the Department was, at least in part, doing so with a judicial/lawyer¶s perspective. Of 
course, legislation always requires Cabinet level approval, and Governments act politically. 
But at the critical earlier stages of policy formation, when the LCD came at a problem, it did 
so with some sense that the courts and the judges were its client, not a political secretary of 
state. It was through mechanisms controlled by the LCD that the revolution in judicial review 
triggered by the introduction of Rules of the Supreme Court, Rule 53 came about. 
The fundamental change to the nature of the LCD which came about as a result of its 
conversion to the DCA, and in particular the attempt to abolish the office of Lord Chancellor, 
was recognised as creating a crisis for the judiciary. The result was a wholesale reform of 
judicial leadership and the formal position of the judiciary under the constitution. This was 
accomplished both by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and by new understandings, such as 
WKRVHVHWRXWLQWKHµFRQFRUGDW¶ agreed between the Government and the judiciary. 
But there was no corresponding µUHVFXH¶ for the old /&'¶V role in the rational development 
of the civil law, nor could there have been. In place of the LCD, we now have, in the MoJ, a 
mainstream political spending department, headed by non-lawyer career politicians in the 
House of Commons.8 Within this very much larger department, much the same policy resources 
are devoted to the general, or residual, civil law as was the case under the LCD. 
This transformation of the Whitehall structure for considering reform to civil law took place 
at much the same time as the remedies project was progressing through its stages at the Law 
Commission. The change does not mean, of course, that the permanent policy apparatus at the 
Ministry is no longer capable of assessing and acting on sensible law reform proposals relating 
to the broad civil law. But it does mean that in doing so it is no longer at least partly insulated 
from political pressure in the way it once was. This makes it much more difficult for the 
Ministry to stand up for proposals that might be objectively rational, but which may impact 
negatively on other Departments, or which may carry political dangers. 
 Decision-making within Government 
The nature of the subject matter meant that a non-MoJ department considering the proposals 
looked (a) to its lawyers; and (b) to its litigation lawyers to advise it on the proposals. In doing 
so, the lawyers clearly advised that the proposed reforms held dangers, and had few upsides. 
The Law Commission proposals, particularly those on the private law side, attempted to 
provide a balanced package, albeit based on guess work rather than data. In particular, the 
extension of liability in terms of a narrower test for non-justiciability was balanced against the 
higher fault element RI µtruly SXEOLF¶ and the discretion to disapply joint and several liability. 
However, although this could be argued to be balanced across the public sector as a whole, the 
loser was more likely to be central government departments, the winner public bodies 
delivering direct services, or arms-length regulators. And it was the former who were making 
the decisions. It does not matter how much local authorities might save in routine highways 
litigation, if the Home Office or the Department for Transport might see more high-level policy 
matters before the courts, the subject of a negligence claim. 
It is also worth noting that the natural conservatism of the Government lawyer was 
reinforced by recent shocks to the system. In particular, both freedom of information and 
corporate manslaughter were quoted to Commission officials as examples of what were seen 
as own- goals by Government, the repetition of which was to be avoided. 
 
Conclusions 
The lessons that can be drawn from this history are relevant to the assessment of the practice 
of law reform in England and Wales in a general sense. But they are also lessons that might be 
helpful for anyone considering proposing a project to the Law Commission to keep in mind.  
First, it is highly unlikely that this history could be repeated now. The reason for this, 
however, is not that such a project would now enjoy a better chance of success, but that it would 
be stifled at birth. 
A number of reforms were made to the statutory scheme governing the Commission, and in 
particular to its relationship with Government, in the Law Commissions Act 2009. The reforms 
were designed to improve implementation of Law Commission reports by (in part) preventing 
too wide a gap developing between the intentions of Government and the development of 
proposals by the Commission. In particular, the Act provided for a Protocol to be agreed 
between the Lord Chancellor and the Commission.9  The Protocol agreed in 2010 provides that, 
before commencing a project, the Minister with relevant policy responsibility must, with the 
VXSSRUWRIWKH3HUPDQHQW6HFUHWDU\µJLYHDQXQGHUWDNLQJWKDW WKHUHLVDVHULRXVLQWHQWLRQWR
WDNHIRUZDUGODZUHIRUPLQWKLVDUHD¶DVZHOODVWRSURYLGHVWDIIWROLDLVHZLWKWKH&RPPLVVLRQ 
(Law Commission 2010b, para.7). This requirement for both consideration and commitment at 
a reasonably high political and policy level would, probably, have resulted in the project failing 
for lack of support. 
Even if an initial scoping stage were to be approved, as is at least possible, it is inconceivable 
that, today, it would not be expressly clear whether the scoping report constituted a break- point 
or not. The Protocol requires agreement on review points and on the overall timetable, and even 
before the Protocol was agreed, that had become clear practice (ibid, para.12). 
Some have seen the Protocol as a threat to the independence of the Law Commission. This 
is not the place to argue that point (although I think it wrong). But whether it is desirable or 
not, this is the set up now, and it is therefore relevant for anyone proposing a project for 
inclusion in a Programme of Law Reform. 
Secondly, it would have been very much better if the remedies project had been stifled at 
birth. It may have been a good idea. But law reform is about changing the law for the benefit 
RISHRSOH,WLVQRWDQDEVWUDFWLQWHOOHFWXDOH[HUFLVH$VLJQLILFDQWDPRXQWRIWKLVMXULVGLFWLRQ¶V
scarce law reform resources were spent, for ± on and off ± about seven years, on an endeavour 
that failed, and that, at least in retrospect, can be seen to have inevitably failed. Those law 
reform lawyers engaged on it, of whom I was one, could have been spending their time on 
something useful. 
Thirdly, the Law Commission is heroically non-political in its conduct of projects. However, 
in securing support for a project, both the promoters of a project to the Commission, and the 
Commission itself, have to think, in a broad sense, politically. That includes analysing what 
both the political and the permanent Government will see as the down-sides to the proposal, 
and seeking to neutralise or evade them. 
Thinking politically includes thinking financially. This is not the place to go into the many 
and varied failings of cost/benefit analysis as it is practised in UK policy-making as the central 
part of the Impact Assessment system. However, that system is with us, and will not go away. 
So if a law reform project proposal cannot be at least plausibly presented as saving money, or 
at the very least, being financially neutral, it will not proceed. This fact is best seen, perhaps, 
as a challenge to the ingenuity of the law reformer, not a reason for despair. Even if one 
considers that Impact Assessment is a fundamentally flawed process (as I do), it provides a set 
of rules that can frequently be persuaded to come to the desired outcome. 
Finally, it remains at best an open question whether the Law Commission is likely to be able 
to take on any IDU UHDFKLQJ SURMHFW RQ µSXEOLF ODZ SURSHU¶ under current conditions. The 
Government FRQWUROV WKH /DZ &RPPLVVLRQ¶V DJHQGD a law reform project is conducted in 
collaboration with the Government, and, on the conclusion of a project, it is Government that 
implements it, or not.  The Government cannot, and should not, be neutral about a law reform 
project. It should want the project to be carried out, because it agrees reform in this area is 
necessary. But in approving a project, the Government is also accepting that the Law 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶VYHU\SDUWLFXODUSURFHVVLVDJRRGZD\WRDUULYHDWWKDW reform. At the core of that 
PHWKRGLVWKDWWKH/DZ&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSROLF\PDNLQJSURFHVVLVLQGHSHQGHQWRI*RYHUQPHQW
The remedies project throws into doubt whether the Government is capable of the forbearance 
necessary when the subject of reform is the terms on which the citizen may hold the 
Government itself to account.  
7KHFDYHDWµXQGHUFXUUHQWFRQGLWLRQV¶LVLPSRUWDQW,ILQWKHIXWXUHD*RYernment sought a 
wide-scale constitutional remodelling, then no doubt the Law Commission could have a role 
to play. But that does not appear to be a plausible immediate prospect.  
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Notes 
1
 )RUDVWULNLQJDFFRXQWRIRQHKLVWRULDQ¶VVWUXJJOHZLWKWZRPHPRLUVVHH Janken (2016).   
2
 Perhaps all social science footnotes, if tracked back far enough, originate in immediate personal sense perception: 
Russell (1910).  
3
 The project was rejected in England. It has recently been legislated in Wales (The Renting Homes (Wales) Act 
2016) 
4
 Subsequently published as Fordham (2003).  
5A paper based on the research was given by Professor Marsh at the SLSA conference in Manchester in March 
2008 (and subject to comments from Professors Maurice Sunkin and Colin Scott).  
6
 The Law Commission annual report 2008-8 was published on 7 July 2009, and stated that the Government 
                                               
                                                                                                                                                  
response was received just as the report was went to press. 
7
 These were procedures to stay an application for judicial review for a matter to be referred to the ombuds, and 
IRURPEXGV¶WRKDYHDSRZHUWRUHIHUTXHVWLRQVWRWKHFRXUWWKHDEROLWLRQRIWKHUXOHWKDWDFRPSODLQWFDQQRWEH
investigated by ombuds if it could form a claim to a court, and the abolition of the rule that an MP must refer a 
complaint to the Parliamentary ombuds.  
8
 It is true that Jack Straw (2007 to 2010) and Kenneth Clarke (2010 to 2012) had both been barristers, but both 
were really politicians who had once been lawyers, rather than the political-lawyer figures who had previously 
been Lord Chancellors. The four succeeding Secretaries of State for Justice and Lord Chancellors had had no legal 
training DOWKRXJK'DYLG/LGLQJWRQ¶VGRFWRUDOWKHVLVZDVRQWKH(OL]DEHWKDQ&RXUWRI([FKHTXHU'DYLG*DXNH
practiced as a solicitor in a corporate law firm for some years before election to the House of Commons.  
9
 Law Commissions Act 1965, section 3B, inserted by Law Commission Act 2009. 
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